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This paper argues that conflict could occur when horizontal inequalities (HIs) last for a longer 
time, as this gives opportunities to political leaders to mobilize dissatisfied caste and ethnic 
groups against the state. Using the data of the 1990s and early years of the new millennium, 
the study validates the argument by presenting data on four dimensions of the HIs—cultural, 
economic, social and political. It examines factors of language and religion for explaining 
cultural HIs: poverty, income, and employment related indicators for economic HIs; literacy, 
educational attainment and the human development index for social HIs; and participation 
in state organs for political HIs. The paper demonstrates that there are high inequalities 
among different caste and ethnic groups of Nepal in the four dimensions. The situation of 
excluded caste and ethnic groups such as Dalit, Janajati, Madhesi and Muslims is the same as 
before or even worsening compared to Brahmin/Chhetri and Newar in those dimensions. 
introdUction
Nepal’s social mosaic is as diverse as its 
topography. It has 103 caste and ethnic groups 
speaking more than 92 languages. Despite such 
diversity, Nepal has never experienced violent 
conflict until February 1996 when the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoists) began their people’s war. 
The Maoists raised a 40-point list of demands which 
were multifarious and covered four aspects: political, 
social, cultural and economic transformations.1 
These demands were not fulfilled by the government, 
and consequently the Maoists began their war in 
February 1996. Initially, they raised these demands 
on the basis of class inequality and later switched 
over to address inequality between caste and ethnic 
groups. The conflict was launched at a time when 
the economy was growing at a modest rate of around 
five percent. This suggests that there was a need 
for “growth with equity” —equity among both 
individuals and groups.
The effects of Maoist conflict is documented 
elsewhere (Tiwari 2009, INSEC 2007, Thapa and 
Sinjapati 2004). It had wide ranging effects, the most 
critical being the loss of human lives. The conflict killed 
13,347 people and damaged properties worth more 
than five billion Rupees by the end of 2006. The effect 
was greatest in the Mid-Western Development Region 
where the conflict started. Judging by the number of 
1. The 40-point demand is given in Gurung 2005.
casualties, the intensity of the conflict can be divided 
into two phases: (i) a medium intensity conflict until 
July 2001, and (ii) a high intensity conflict beginning 
in November 2001, with the failure of the first peace 
talks held from July to November 2001 followed by 
the subsequent mobilization of the army.
The conflict came to an end with the signing of 
the comprehensive peace accord (CPA) on November 
21, 2006. Some significant achievements have been 
made since then; the major ones include most notably 
the absence of deadly conflict and an increasing 
recognition of marginalized groups, as indicated by 
the number of marginalized group representatives in 
the new Constituent Assembly and symbolized by 
the election of a Madhesi head of state.  However, 
the struggle for identity recognition and inclusion in 
the process of making a new constitution in Nepal is 
still ongoing. 
The implementation of the CPA and the 
restoration of lasting peace require that the reasons 
for the decade-long Maoist conflict be addressed. 
Some studies have been conducted on this subject, 
but most of them either lack empirical footing 
or are inconclusive. Those that are empirically 
based are not conclusive: some point to poverty 
and underdevelopment while others advance 
landlessness as the reasons behind the conflict. 
This divergence is due to differences in approach 
and methodology. Most of the empirical studies use 
district level data on poverty and wellbeing related 
horizontAL inequALitieS And 
vioLent conFLict in nepAL
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Each of these dimensions is important in itself, but any one 
of them can also hamper progress made in other dimensions. 
Horizontal inequalities are closely related to the concept 
of social exclusion, and the two concepts are at times used 
interchangeably. Unequal societies in which certain groups 
are discriminated against can lead to the exclusion of those 
groups. Similarly, social exclusion fuels inequality between 
groups. Like horizontal inequalities, social exclusion is 
multidimensional, encompassing social, economic and 
political forms of exclusion. However, horizontal inequalities 
are not always severe enough to lead to a situation defined as 
social exclusion. Policies and initiatives to reduce horizontal 
inequalities and social exclusion can be quite similar; both 
take a multidimensional approach and generally target groups 
rather than individuals.2 
the role of horizontal inequalities in conflict
The contemporary rational choice literature on the origins 
of conflict and civil war offers two possible explanations: (i) 
grievance and (ii) greed or opportunities. The first refers to 
historical injustices and inter-group inequalities in economic, 
social and political rights, and the second explanation 
emphasizes the role of rents, which are occasionally loot-
able, in producing inter-group rivalry for their control. Both 
of these ultimately can result in war. Similarly, Collier and 
Hoeffler (1999) grouped potential causes of conflict into two 
groups: the quest for justice and the quest for loot. Of these 
two explanations, the grievance approach is more relevant for 
explaining the Maoist conflict in Nepal.
Horizontal inequalities support the grievance approach 
and originate in the theory of relative deprivation. Primarily 
influenced by the work of Gurr (1970), Stewart (2000) 
advanced horizontal inequalities as the reason behind 
grievances felt by excluded groups which, when mobilized by 
“conflict entrepreneurs,” can erupt into violent conflict.3  
However, several studies conducted in different parts of the 
world provide reasons other than horizontal inequalities as the 
cause of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004b), and Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) found that poorer countries face greater risk of 
conflict; however, their interpretation is different. Collier and 
Hoeffler argue that the low opportunity cost for rebels and the 
large stock of easily expropriated natural resources or primary 
commodities in an area are the motivating factors behind 
the conflict. On the other hand, Fearon and Laitin hold that 
conflict develops in poor countries because they have weak 
governance due to a lack of resources, as suggested by Deng 
(2004). Langer (2005) also points to the fact that people—both 
rich and poor—in many societies and states have been living 
together in harmony for generations without any violent conflict 
among them. But this refers to cases of vertical inequality or 
2. http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/social-exclusion/links-
between-social-exclusion-and-inequality
3. Stewart et al. (2006) used the word ‘conflict entrepreneur’. This 
refers to unsatisfied leaders who mobilise groups with grievances for conflict. 
indicators and make an attempt to explain conflict measured 
in terms of the number of people killed and displaced or 
by some other measure of insecurity. Additionally, there are 
some studies that present data on exclusion and inequality by 
different caste and ethnic group and by gender, but they do 
not establish a connection between inequality and conflict. 
In fact, there is a dearth of detailed empirical studies on 
horizontal inequality (HI) as an explanation for the conflict in 
Nepal. In view of this shortcoming, the present study makes 
an attempt to understand it from the lens of exclusion and 
inequality of different caste and ethnic groups—a variant of 
HIs—in Nepal.
This paper argues that enduring horizontal inequality 
provided a basis for the Maoists to mobilize various groups 
with grievances. In order to develop this argument, the 
paper is organized into four sections. The next section 
of the paper considers the concept and role of horizontal 
inequality and distinguishes it from the traditional concept 
of inequality among individuals which Stewart (2000) calls 
vertical inequality. The third section reviews the literature 
on the relationship between such inequality and conflict in 
Nepal and identifies the gap in the knowledge of the subject. 
Subsequently, the Section provides empirical evidence of 
inequality in four dimensions across the various caste and 
ethnic groups to support the argument of the paper that 
horizontal inequality offered the ground for violent conflict 
in Nepal. The final section summarizes key findings in order 
to provide an explanation for the rise of conflict. 
the concept oF horiZontAl ineQUAlitieS
Horizontal inequalities (HIs) refer to inequalities between 
socio-culturally defined groups with shared identities 
formed around religion, ethnic ties or racial or caste-based 
affiliations. It is distinguished from vertical inequality, a 
term coined by Frances Stewart (2000), which refers to 
inequality mostly between individuals within an otherwise 
homogenous population. Thus, vertical inequalities focus 
on individuals, whereas horizontal inequalities refer to 
inequalities between groups.  Horizontal inequalities are 
multidimensional and encompass economic, social, cultural 
and political dimensions as follows: 
•	 The economic dimension includes inequalities 
in ownership of assets, income and employment 
opportunities.
•	 The social dimension covers inequalities in access 
to a range of services and in their human outcomes 
(including education, health and nutrition).
•	 The political dimension consists of inequalities 
in the distribution of political opportunities and 
power across the groups at different levels, including 
political, bureaucratic and military power.
•	 The cultural dimension refers to differences in 
recognition and hierarchical status of the cultural 
norms, customs and practices of different groups 
(Stewart. et al. 2007; Langer and Brown 2007). 
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inequality among individuals. Against this backdrop, the 
main argument of this paper is that an individual deprived of 
political, economic, social and cultural rights cannot revolt, but 
a deprived group can fight against the state if it is mobilized by 
a political party or leaders.
Therefore, Ostby (2004) suggests that the inequality-conflict 
nexus needs to be investigated both vertically and horizontally, 
with more refined measures of various dimensions of inequality. 
The main objective of her paper is to explore whether or not 
horizontal inequality affects the probability of civil conflict 
when tested quantitatively across many cases. Using data from 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for 33 developing 
countries, Ostby constructs aggregated macro-indicators 
for inequality between the two largest ethnic groups in each 
country along three dimensions: social, economic and health-
related. She also generates measures of ethnic fractionalization 
and polarization based on the DHS data. The main findings 
of her study are: (i) social horizontal inequality is positively 
related to conflict outbreak; and (ii) ethnic composition and 
inequality between individuals are not significant explanations 
for conflict. Therefore, she concludes that it is too early to reject 
the inequality–conflict nexus and that future conflict studies 
should also explore the concept of “horizontal polarization”.
Stewart (2005b) argues that reducing inequalities between 
groups should be a significant aspect of policy making in 
the post-conflict period. The paper argues that the types 
of policies aimed at reducing group inequalities are fairly 
common in ethnically divided societies. They are of two types: 
(i) policies designed for correcting unfair processes, and (ii) 
positive discriminatory policies such as the use of quotas 
and targets. These policies have been effective in Malaysia 
and North Ireland in sustaining or promoting peace. Despite 
their importance in many post-conflict situations, the author 
points out that they rarely form an explicit part of the post-
conflict development agenda. Stewart (2005b) illustrated this 
point by reviewing general statements about post-conflict 
policies and examining two case studies—Mozambique and 
Guatemala—where horizontal inequalities were one of the 
sources of conflict. She found that HIs have been ignored in 
post-conflict Mozambique where in fact most policies have 
tended to accentuate the inequality.  In Guatemala some of the 
peace protocols contained provisions for correcting horizontal 
inequalities but they have not been put into effect. This is 
mainly because political obstacles prevented such policies from 
being adopted. The author suggests that such policies need 
to be adopted with political sensitivity as they can become a 
source of conflict themselves, as in the case of Sri Lanka.
While there has been considerable analysis of the impact 
of structural adjustment policies on poverty and inequality 
among individuals, there has been almost none on the impact 
of structural adjustment on inequality between culturally 
defined groups. Therefore, Langer et al. (2007) point out that 
socio-economic inequality among groups is important from 
a number of perspectives – it can have adverse effects on 
the wellbeing of members of deprived groups, it can impede 
efficiency, it may make it very difficult to eradicate poverty, 
lead to unfair and exclusionary societies, and increase the 
risk of violent conflict. Hence, the authors suggest that it is 
important to analyze the impact of structural adjustment 
policies on horizontal inequality.
Langer and Brown (2007)  analyze the relationship 
between culture and conflict within the broader framework of 
horizontal inequalities. Their paper argues that an important 
link between culture and group mobilization, including violent 
conflict, is the extent to which cultural groups’ practices and 
customs are differentially recognized in and by the state. 
Differences in the status afforded to different cultures by the 
state, whether implicitly or explicitly, and popular perceptions 
of and anxieties over differences in cultural status constitute 
a dimension of horizontal inequalities. The authors describe 
them as cultural status inequalities. Moreover, the paper 
argues that the most dangerous situations exist where all 
three dimensions of horizontal inequality – socioeconomic, 
political and cultural status – run in the same direction, or 
are consistent.
In summary, the research conducted by CRISE and some 
others suggest that horizontal inequality is more likely to 
provoke conflict when:4 
•	 it is not only sustained, but also widens over time. 
•	 it is consistent across four dimensions. 
•	 group boundaries are relatively impermeable. If 
there is easy mobility across group boundaries, then 
inequalities can be overcome at the individual level if 
not at the group level, by individuals “joining” the more 
privileged group. 
•	 there are fairly large numbers of people in different 
groups. If the underprivileged group is very small, 
then the chances of successfully advancing their 
position through conflict may also be small (or the 
conflict can be easily suppressed), making violent 
conflict less likely. 
•	 aggregate incomes are stagnant or slow growing, so 
that there is little or no improvement in the absolute 
economic and social position of the deprived. 
•	 groups are sufficiently cohesive enabling collective 
action to emerge. 
•	 leaders emerge and are not incorporated into the 
ruling system; this is particularly likely to be the 
case where there is political inequality (or political 
exclusion of some groups). 
•	 the government is irresponsive (or, worse, 
proactively and violently repressive) and 
consequently there is no redress for problems 
through peaceful means (Stewart 2005a). 
Using data gathered from eight country case studies, 
4. See www.crise.ox.ac.uk for research by CRISE on horizontal 
inequality.
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There is also inequality in access to formal sector jobs. 
Civil service employment reflects caste differences. The 
Brahman-Chhetri-Newar ethnic groups dominate the 
highest job levels such as the Secretary and Joint Secretary of 
government ministries and departments as 87 percent of all 
university graduates are from the higher status ethnic groups 
and castes. Many jobs are said to be allocated according to 
social connections. Democratization in 1990 appears to 
have increased corruption and nepotism and weakened legal 
institutions (Pandey 2000).
Lawoti is one among few Nepali researchers who pursued 
inequalities between caste and ethnic groups in the later 
years of the conflict. In his 2007 study he argues that over-
centralization of the polity was the underlying cause of 
the multiple violent and nonviolent conflicts and crises in 
Nepal. Governance structures, including the first-past-the-
post electoral system and the centralizing political culture, 
concentrated power in the center. Moreover, centralized power 
was mostly concentrated in the executive body and accessed 
largely by Brahman and Chhetri castes of the Hills. This over-
centralization contributed to abuse of power, corruption, 
Stewart et al. (2007) held that horizontal inequality can cause 
conflict when there is inequality among the socio-cultural 
groups (Box 1). In summary, they advanced the idea that 
horizontal inequality is a multidimensional concept, and it 
can be an important source of conflict, especially where the 
inequalities are consistent across the four dimensions. While 
social and economic horizontal inequality generally generates 
fertile ground for conflict to emerge, and cultural status 
inequality acts to bind groups together, political inequality 
between groups provides incentives for leaders to mobilize 
people for rebellion. Conditions of severe socio-economic 
inequality, abrupt changes in political inequality, or cultural 
events (in which important cultural or religious symbols 
are attacked) often constitute powerful triggers to conflict 
(Stewart et al. 2007: 432–33). 
It is generally accepted that none of the four dimensions 
act alone, but that it is the dynamics, or interplay between 
them that can lead to violence. For example, political and 
economic inequalities can enable elites to manipulate ethnic 
or religious identities into violent conflict. Natural resources 
may not cause conflict, but they may prolong it, and are often 
central to the political economy of war. 
horiZontAl ineQUAlitieS And the mAoiSt 
conFlict in nepAl
Most of the studies conducted on the causes of the Nepali 
conflict do not employ horizontal inequalities as tools of 
analysis. Generally, they have proposed economic inequality 
among individuals or spatial inequality (as measured by the 
poverty rate or gini coefficient of income or assets such as 
land) rather than inequality between the social or cultural 
groups as the reason for conflict (Karmacharya and Sharma 
2003, Pandey 2000). Others have described exclusion and 
inequality with a focus on the excluded groups (Lawoti 2002, 
Neupane 2005, and DFID and World Bank 2006), but they do 
not directly link this with the conflict. However, this paper 
reviews only those which deal with horizontal inequalities  or 
have alluded to horizontal inequalities. Readers interested in 
other studies can find a brief review in Tiwari (2009).
Gradstein and Milanovic (2004) found that social 
exclusion is common in Nepal and has been the fundamental 
reason why Maoists received support from excluded groups. 
Exclusion is along overlapping caste, ethnic and geographic 
lines. Abrupt political transitions and inexperience with 
democratic processes in general tend to exacerbate entrenched 
social exclusions within society.
Murshed and Gates (2005) argue that Nepal’s development 
process has neglected agriculture, and rural poverty is 
exacerbated by high levels of landlessness, despite some 
unsuccessful attempts at land reform in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Loopholes allowed large landowners to continue to control 
the most land. According to the 2001 census 1.2 million, or 
around one quarter of the total households in Nepal, do not 
own land. The authors found a positive association between 
landlessness and intensity of conflict.
box 1: what does the evidence show about the relationship 
between horizontal inequalities and conflict? 
Based on 8 country studies from three regions of the world and 
some inter-country analysis of a broader range of countries, the 
following are the major findings on the relationship between 
HIs and conflict.
1. The probability of conflict occurring rises where 
socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and exclusion are higher
2. Conflict is more likely where political and
 socioeconomic HIs are high and exist together.  
3. Inclusive (or power-sharing) governments tend
 to reduce the likelihood of conflict.
4. Inequality of cultural recognition among groups is an 
additional motivation for conflict.
5. Perceptions of horizontal inequalities affect the likelihood of 
conflict
6. The presence of natural resources can be a significant cause of 
separatist conflict, as well as of local conflict, 
often working through the impact this has on HIs.
8. The nature of the state and the role of the government are of 
enormous importance to whether or not serious conflict erupts 
and persists.
9. International policies and statistics are too often blind to the 
issue of HIs.
Stewart et al. 2007
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erosion of democratic institutions, and governmental 
instability. He argues that centralization also contributed to 
ethnic exclusion and conflicts. However, the study does not 
show the relationship between horizontal inequalities  and 
conflict.
The first important study looking empirically into the 
relation between horizontal inequality  and conflict in Nepal 
is by Murshed and Gates (2005). It suggests that grievances 
rather than greed are the main motivating force and that 
horizontal and inter-group inequality is central in explaining 
social conflict in Nepal. The conflict has both caste and ethnic 
dimensions. Additionally, the study found that the intensity 
of conflict is considerably higher in the mid- and far-western 
development regions of Nepal where there is lack of human 
development and considerable inequality in the distribution 
of land. According to the authors, ethnicity mobilizes groups 
to fight each other, and that ethnicity, whether based on 
language, religion or some other form, is a far more powerful 
catalyst for conflict than is social class. The authors found 
that grievance is rooted in deep inter-group disparities 
encompassing: (i) asset inequality, (ii) unequal access to 
public employment and public services, (iii) over-taxation, 
and (iv) economic mis-management. Thus, they inferred 
that development strategies failed to meet the challenges of 
poverty and the reduction of horizontal inequality.
Hatlebakk (2007), who excludes the Tarai districts plus 
Rolpa and Rukum from his analysis, estimated a Poisson 
regression model with level of conflict as the dichotomous 
variable. He denies the finding described by Murshed and 
Gates (2005) that landlessness has a positive influence on the 
level of conflict. He separates “Maoist control” from “level of 
conflict” in these districts, and finds that poverty, in contrast 
to landlessness, explains Maoist influence.5 Thus, he found 
that districts with more landless people are less likely to be 
affected by conflict, as measured by the number of casualties 
and displacements. He points out that Murshed and Gates 
(2005) found a positive correlation between landlessness and 
conflict because they used the actual number of killings per 
person of a district as the dependent variable and estimated 
regression for all 75 districts including Rolpa and Rukum 
where the largest numbers of people were killed. He also 
shows that if Rolpa and Rukum are excluded then their 
positive relationship disappears. Therefore, he argued that it 
is because of methodological fallacies, viz, the inclusion of 
outlier districts, viz. Rolpa and Rukum, such a correlation 
appears.
While Murshed and Gates (2005) found that grievance 
due to land inequality is the motivating force for conflict and 
5. Hatlebakk (2007) distinguishes between the terms “Maoist control” 
and “level of conflict”: the former refers to the districts where Maoists gained 
control by establishing their own government, and the latter refers to the 
number of people killed or displaced in a district. He separated these two 
concepts because the districts where Maoists have established their control 
do not necessarily have a higher number of casualties. 
that Nepal’s conflict has ethnic and caste dimensions, Do and 
Iyer (2007) found higher conflict intensity in the districts 
with higher poverty or lower level of economic development, 
but weaker evidence that caste and ethnic divisions and 
linguistic diversity are correlated with intensity of civil 
conflict.
Using district level data of 72 districts, Tiwari (2007) 
estimated two regression models with two separate 
dependent variables used to measure the conflict: (i) a 
logit model with level of insecurity as a dummy dependent 
variable – districts with conflict were assigned a value of one 
and districts without conflict were assigned a zero value; and 
(ii) a linear regression model with number of people killed 
as the dependent variable. The specification of the “level of 
insecurity” is based on the stages of conflict as defined by the 
UN system in Nepal. Districts at stage 3 have been considered 
districts with conflict, and those with stages 1 and 2 were 
thought of as without conflict because in the latter two stages 
the UN continues its operations throughout the district.6 
Based on the two models, Tiwari (2007) found that in 
addition to poverty and food security, caste polarization is 
also correlated with conflict.7 In particular the author found 
that districts with a higher proportion of Janajatis (Indigenous 
people) have a lower level of insecurity/conflict. Therefore, 
this study corroborates the findings of Gurung (2005). Given 
the fact that the poverty rate among Janajati is higher than 
that among Brahman and Newar in Nepal; this at first glance 
suggests that poverty is not the sole reason for the conflict. 
However, when poverty is coupled with other grievances, 
conflict could erupt. But this requires group cohesion and 
mobilization against the state, and therefore a need to study 
horizontal inequalities .
Ostby (2004) points out that various studies have come 
up with different results mainly because of methodological 
differences. However, civil wars occur when groups mobilize 
against each other; their leaders use ethnicity, or some other 
characteristic like religion, to unite and mobilize the group. 
Such mobilization is effective where there are substantial 
horizontal inequalities rather than vertical inequality 
(Stewart 2000). This suggests that horizontal inequalities 
are more important than vertical inequality for the onset and 
6. The UN classified districts in Nepal according to their security 
situations as they apply to UN personnel. There are five phases of 
security, starting with phase one with the lowest insecurity and five with 
the highest insecurity, as follows:  Phase 1: warning; phase 2: restricted 
movement; phase 3: relocation; phase 4: emergency operation; and phase 
5: evacuations. As of December 2, 2004, the UN classified districts within 
three phases: 38 districts in phase one; one district in phase two; and 36 
districts in phase three. For further details see (Tiwari 2007 and 2009). 
7. Here poverty refers to head count poverty rate; food security is 
measured as the rate of stunted growth among children under five, and 
caste polarization is measured by the proportion of Janajati to the total 
population. Generally, the districts with a larger proportion of Janajati have 
less caste polarization.
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and 2003/04 using NLSS data, whereas literacy and education 
are presented and contrasted for 1991 and 2001 based on 
census data. The human development index is estimated 
primarily based on the 2006 NDHS data. Additionally, 
political participation is compared for the years 1999 and 
2006 using data extracted from Lawoti (2007) and Neupane 
(2005). 
the Social mosaic of nepal
Horizontal inequality has not been well researched in 
Nepal because data classified by caste and ethnicity was not 
collected in the population census until 1991.  Therefore, 
there is still a lack of adequate data on different dimensions 
of welfare organized in terms of these rubrics. 
The 2001 census in Nepal recorded a population of 
23,151,423 people, of whom 51 percent were female.8 The 
cultural and social mosaic as presented in Annex 1 reveals 
that Nepal is not a country with a simple majority-minority. 
However, Hinduism is the dominant religion and Nepali is 
spoken by a little less than half the population.  The country 
has recently been declared a secular state along with several 
other transitions including its declaration as a republic. 
Further details are given in UNDP/Nepal (2009).
Household sample surveys collect information from a 
limited number of samples. This is hardly enough to estimate 
the values of indicators for 103 caste and ethnic groups. 
Therefore, generally these groups are merged into around 11 
broader categories in order to use survey data to estimate and 
analyze horizontal inequality. 
Various studies have grouped caste and ethnicity 
somewhat differently. However, across most of the studies, 
the three major groups that appear common are Janajati, 
Brahman and Chhetri, and Dalits which comprise around 
37%, 33% and 12% of the total population, respectively 
(Lawoti 2007, UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006, and DFID and 
World Bank 2006). Besides, the one group, which has a larger 
share is “Tarai Middle castes” holding about 13 percent of 
total population (DFID and World Bank 2006). While most 
Brahman, Chhetris and Dalits speak Nepali, Janajatis speak 
different languages such as Tamang and Magar. Additionally, 
a larger number of other Nepali people speak Newari, Maithili 
and Bhojpuri (Annex 1).
Following the DFID and World Bank (2006) classification, 
this paper uses 7 groups and 11 sub-groups for the analysis of 
horizontal inequality mainly in three dimensions:  political, 
social and economic. The following sections first describe 
the cultural dimension followed by the economic, social and 
political dimensions.
cultural discrimination 
In contemporary Nepal, gender, caste and ethnicity are 
8. However, because of the conflict, the population census was not 
conducted in all the settlements and therefore information was enumerated 
for only 22,736,934 people.
continuation of civil war.
The studies reviewed above have the following lacunae:
1. Some are static, presenting data collected at one point 
in time, and thus fail to validate the reasons for conflict;
2. Some others depict the inequality but hardly link it 
with its possible consequences such as violent conflict;
3. Several studies are descriptive and lack empirical 
analysis;
4. Most of the studies have a spatial focus;
 
Most of the studies are not conclusive; moreover there is 
dissimilarity in their results partly because of the differences 
in the methodology and partly because of the lack of a 
comprehensive conceptual framework.
This study fills the gaps noted above by taking a systematic 
presentation and analysis of horizontal inequality in its four 
dimensions and linking them to the conflict. The study is 
cognizant of the fact that horizontal inequalities  cannot 
of themselves result in violent conflict unless “conflict 
entrepreneurs” mobilize groups to ignite conflict. Thus, 
horizontal inequalities  provide an environment where 
conflicts can begin and thrive.
horizontal inequality in nepal
The Maoist conflict in Nepal was not a sudden event. It 
was an organized conflict initiated as early as 1996 and it 
continued for more than a decade. A conflict triggered by a 
leader cannot be sustained unless there is constant socio-
economic inequality between different groups. Consequently, 
the present paper advances the  following two interrelated 
arguments which suggest a reason for the conflict in Nepal.
•	 Conflict is more likely to occur where there are 
significant cultural, political and socio-economic 
horizontal inequalities between different caste and 
ethnic groups; and
•	 conflict is more likely to occur when horizontal 
inequalities  are being sustained or are widening across 
caste and ethnic groups. 
In order to advance these two arguments, the paper 
uses data collected in the 1990s and the early years of the 
new millennium when the conflict expanded and reached 
its pinnacle in 2002.  The method adopted is to present 
various socio-economic indicators and political participation 
indicators across caste and ethnic groups at two points in time 
and find out how unequal the groups are in terms of these 
indicators. Secondary data has been used from following 
surveys:
•	 Population census 1991 and 2001
•	 Nepal living standards survey (NLSS) 1995/96 and 
2003/04
•	 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) 2006
As a single survey does not cover all dimensions of 
inequality, it is difficult to use the same two points in time 
for comparison across all the dimensions. Thus, income, 
expenditure and poverty are compared for the years 1995/96 
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major defining categories and sources of individual identity. 
The Nepal Human Development Report 2009 outlines 
seven types of exclusion and discrimination, including 
caste, ethnicity, region and gender-based discriminations 
(UNDP/Nepal 2009). Caste-based discrimination involves 
discrimination against Dalits; the region-based discrimination 
is against Madhesi, and ethnicity-based discrimination is 
against the 59 indigenous nationalities that do not fall into 
the caste system in Nepal. Therefore, the excluded groups 
in Nepal, in addition to women and the people of the mid-
Western and Far Western development regions, are the 
Janajati, Madhesi, and Dalits. However, women are not 
subject to horizontal inequalities, and the spatial inequality 
has been well researched in the past. Therefore, they are not 
discussed here. 
Cultural discrimination on the following three grounds 
helped to promote the formation of cultural identity in the 
past: (i) differential treatment (formal and informal) with 
respect to religion and religious observation, (ii) differential 
recognition of languages, and (iii) and differential treatment 
of ethno-cultural practices. The cultural differences of 
mountain, hill and Tarai, are also strong factors in identity 
formation, and creating differences between the people of 
Tarai and the Hills of Nepal. 
The “one religion, one language and one culture” policy 
of the state in the past ignored the cultural diversity, creating 
cultural exclusion through the lack of national recognition 
of other languages and of symbols like the dress and food 
of other ethnic groups. This primarily affected the Janajatis 
(who are almost 37 percent of the population, speak more 
than 80 languages or dialects, follow animism and have 
distinct cultural practices) and the Madhesis (who are 
linguistically and socially very diverse and follow different 
food and cultural practices than the people of the hills). The 
symbolism of dress has also created deep resentments e.g. the 
hill topi (a cap) is considered “Nepali,” and the Madhesi dhoti 
is considered “Indian,” which created identity issues for the 
Madhesis. This lack of recognition of linguistic and cultural 
diversity created a deep sense of disrespect and frustration 
among the Janajatis and Madhesis who felt undermined and 
humiliated. These cultural manifestations of differences 
have been present for generations. Cultural discrimination 
against certain groups served as a basis of solidarity to move 
against the state. Besides this, the caste- and gender-based 
discriminations also contributed to move against the state 
(see for detail UNDP/Nepal 2009). 
inequality in economic outcomes
This section presents data on poverty, income, consumption 
and employment levels in eleven caste and ethnic groups and 
examines the level of economic inequality among them.
Poverty and Inequality
Table 1 provides the estimates of the level of poverty in 
eleven caste and ethnic groups at two points in time: 1995/96 
and 2003/04. It shows that only 19 percent of Newar were 
poor as opposed to 58 percent of Dalits in 1995/96. The 
percent of Janajati living in poverty was between these two 
groups with levels ranging from 49 percent in the Hills to 53 
percent among Tarai Janajati. Only three caste groups had a 
poverty rate of one third or less, whereas the rest were above 
the national average of 42 percent in 1995/96. The economic 
situation of these caste and ethnic groups did not change 
in 2003/04 even after a period of 8 years. Dalits are at the 
bottom with the highest percent living in poverty (46%), 
and Newar had the lowest level of poverty (14%) in 2003/04 
(Table 1). In fact, poverty rate among the caste and ethnic 
groups varies more widely than among the regions (See 
Annex 2 for spatial inequality).
This demonstrates that there is high economic inequality 
among different caste and ethnic groups. Moreover, the inequality 
is not decreasing over time. This is because the decrease in 
poverty is uneven: a rapid decrease occurred among advantaged 
castes like the Brahman, Chhetri and Newar (BCN), whereas 
a slow decline was found among Janajati, Dalits and Muslims 
between 1995/96 and 2003/04. Among the Janajatis, the rate of 
decline varies widely, with a higher reduction in poverty among 
Tarai Janajati than among their Hill counterparts. 
Consequently, the Gini Coefficient, a measure of 
inequality, has increased from 0.34 in 1995/96 to 0.41 in 
2003/04.  Thus, in spite of a decrease in poverty across 
all caste and ethnic groups, there is a wide gap between 
the poverty rates of different groups. Dalits, Muslims and 
some indigenous peoples were the most deprived groups in 
1995/96, and they still were in 2003/04. 
Apart from the incidence of poverty, its depth and severity 
is also highest among Dalits and certain Janajatis (Table 1).9 
This shows a persistence of poverty and inequality among 
excluded groups in Nepal. The inherent reason for the highest 
levels of poverty among excluded groups is rooted in the 
asset-based inequality which is not discussed in this paper.10 
However, an attempt has been made to look further into their 
consumption/income in the following section. 
9. There are three measures of poverty: incidence, depth and severity, 
popularly known as FGT measures. while poverty incidence, also called as 
head count rate, shows the proportion of population below a poverty line, 
the other two poverty measures show depth or quality of poverty. 
10. According to the NLSS 2003/04, the poverty rate was higher 
in landless households, households with a larger family size or a larger 
number of children and among the households with illiterate heads. In fact, 
the rate was found to decrease with  increase in the size of holding, decrease 
in family size or number of dependents, and increase in year of schooling of 
heads, implying that apart from spatial and horizontal variation, the level of 
poverty also varies because of other characteristics (CBS 2005).
By occupational groups, poverty is highest among agriculture 
wage laborers followed by self-cultivating agriculture operators. In fact, 
the poverty rates among agricultural wage laborers remained virtually 
unchanged (56% in 1995/96 and 54% in 2003/04). This also implies that 
those who were poor before remain poor still.
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have much less than a proportionate share in all non-agricultural 
spheres including government service. The Janajati, with a 37 
percent share of the total population in 2001, held only 3 percent 
of technical positions and half a percent of administrative 
positions. Dalits make up 12 percent of the population but 
hold three percent of technical positions and 0.3 percent of 
administrative professions (Annex 4). One reason why Dalits 
occupy a higher percentage of technical positions than Janajati 
is because they run their own technical enterprises including 
sewing, shoe making and iron related activities. Compared to 
these two groups, the employment opportunities for Brahmans, 
Chhetri and Newar are better. There was  an increase in the labor 
force participation in administrative and technical occupations 
between 1996 and 2001. However, the rate of increase does 
not correspond to that of the share of Dalit and Janajati peoples 
in the total population.
inequality in Social outcomes
Apart from economic inequality between groups, there is also 
social inequality. This is due to the inter-dependence of different 
types of capital and capabilities as explained by Stewart (2009). 
This section presents data on only two capabilities: literacy and 
educational attainment.
The literacy rate is lower among Dalits and religious 
minorities, including Muslims. It is highly unequal: only eleven 
percent of Tarai Dalits were literate compared to 59 percent of 
Tarai Brahman and Chhetri. The situation has not improved 
even after a decade. Even in 2001, the Tarai Dalits had the lowest 
proportion of literate individuals and the Tarai Brahman and 
Chhetri had the highest. In fact, between 1991 and 2001, the 
increase in the literacy rate was generally hovering between 10 
to 14 percent for most of the caste and ethnic groups. And it is 
disheartening to note that the Tarai Dalit had the lowest increase 
at only 10 percent – merely one percent annual increase in the 
Inequality in Income and Consumption
Like the poverty rate, the level of consumption also varied 
widely across different caste and ethnic groups in the years 
1995/96 and 2003/04. Within this period, the consumption 
level increased for all groups but the increase was much 
larger for Newars and Brahman/Chhetris than Dalits. This 
implies that the consumption gap among different caste and 
ethnic groups has widened over time.11 Moreover, a significant 
inequality in annual per capita income was found in 2003/04. It 
ranges from NRs. 8,830 among Hill Dalits to NRs. 23,900 among 
the Tarai Brahman and Chhetri. Even within the same caste and 
ethnic group, wide variation in income exists between the sub-
groups and the rural and urban areas. The annual per capita 
income of a rural Brahman is just NRs. 15,674 which is less than 
half of the urban Brahman’s per capita income. The discrepancy 
is even higher among the Newar. Among Dalits, the discrepancy 
is smaller, and smaller still among Muslim households where the 
per capita income of urban and rural Muslims is NRs. 11,563 
and NRs. 10,126, respectively (Annex 3).
The wealthy in Nepal are those who do not adopt agriculture as 
their main occupation. They generally belong to Brahmin/Chhetri 
and Newar groups. These people mostly work as professional and 
administrative workers. On the other hand, the disadvantaged 
caste and ethnic groups such as the Dalits, Janajati and Madhesi 
11. The multivariate analysis of consumption patterns among different 
caste and ethnic groups indicates that the socially excluded groups have 
to pay a ‘caste/ethnic penalty’. Even when the effect of factors such as the 
household size, the number of children in the household, the household 
head’s occupation and level of education, land ownership, receipt of 
remittances, residence, ecological location, etc., are controlled, the average 
per capita consumption of groups which have suffered from social exclusion 
remains much lower than those of Newars and Brahman/Chhetris (DFID and 
World Bank 2006).  This is the result of direct and indirect discrimination of 
the excluded groups in Nepali society.
Table 1: Incidence of Poverty by Caste and Ethnic Groups, Nepal 1995-96 and 2003-04
Caste and Ethnic 
Groups
Poverty Headcount Rate Distribution of the Poor Distribution of Population
1995-96 2003-04
Change 
in %
1995-96 2003-04
Change 
in %
1995-96 2003-04
Change 
in %
Brahman/Chhetri 34.1 18.4 -46 26.7 15.7 -41 32.7 26.3 -20
Tarai Middle 
Castes
28.7 21.3 -26 2.9 1.9 -33 4.2 2.8 -34
Dalit 57.8 45.5 -21 10.6 10.9 3 7.7 7.4 -4
Newar 19.3 14.0 -28 2.5 3.4 35 5.5 7.5 38
Hill Janajati 48.7 44.0 -10 19.7 27.8 41 16.9 19.5 16
Tarai Janajati 53.4 35.4 -34 10.4 9.2 -12 8.2 8.1 -1
Muslim 43.7 41.3 -6 5.7 8.7 53 5.4 6.5 19
Other 46.1 31.3 -32 21.4 22.3 4 19.4 21.9 13
Total 41.8 30.8 -26 100 100 - 100 100 -
Note: The trends in poverty rates across caste-ethnic groups should be treated with caution. 
Source: CBS 2005.
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literacy rate during the 1990s (Table 2).
The inequality in educational attainment seems to be 
unequal when the proportion of university graduate of a caste 
or ethnic group is compared to the group’s percent of the 
total population as given in Table 3. For example, Brahman 
and Chhetris made up about 34 percent of the population; 
however, they had about 59 percent of graduates in the country 
in 1991. On the other hand, Dalits, with about 12 percent of 
the population, made up less than one percent of graduates. 
In fact, the educational situation of Dalits remained the same 
compared to other caste and ethnic groups during the decade 
1991 – 2001. On the other hand, the proportion of graduates 
from the Brahman and Chhetri group increased from 59 to 67 
percent. Thus, Dalits still have educational attainment levels 
far below those of the Brahman and Chhetri. Following the 
Dalits, Muslims and Janajatis have lower levels of educational 
attainment. In fact, the proportion of the population with 
School Leaving Certificates (SLC) and university graduate 
degrees decreased among Janajatis from 1991 to 2001 (Table 
3).
caste/ethnicity and human development 
The UNDP has used the human development index (HDI) 
as an all-encompassing measure of human development. 
Using data from the 2006 Nepal Demographic and Heath 
Survey, HDI estimates for 11 caste and ethnic groups are 
presented in Table 4. The comparison of HDI by caste and 
ethnicity shows that HDI varies widely across the groups. 
In fact, this variation is wider than the differences in HDI 
between geographical areas (see UNDP/Nepal 2009 for 
details). This points to a need to examine caste and ethnicity 
within a particular region. For example, in  the Tarai, Dalits 
have the lowest HDI value, whereas Brahman and Chhetri 
have the highest (0.383 vs. 0.625). 
The people of three caste and ethnic groups—Tarai/
Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri, Newar and Hill Brahman—have 
higher HDI values (0.6 and above) than those of the Dalits, 
both from the Hills and the Tarai. Muslims have an index 
value of less than 0.425—lower than that for Dalits as a 
whole, but higher than the values for Tarai Dalits (Table 4). 
These results are very similar to those of the inclusion index 
constructed by Bennett and Parajuli (2008).12
Of the three components of the HDI, education is the most 
significant factor. This accounts for the wide gap between the 
Brahman/Chhetri and the other castes. The lower HDI for 
Dalits, especially Tarai Dalits and Muslims, is largely derived 
from their very low educational attainment levels compared 
to other components of HDI (Table 4). Their low human 
12. Of the 11 caste and ethnic groups, Madhesi Dalit was found to be 
the most excluded group, followed by Hill Dalits, Muslims and then Tarai 
and Hill Janajatis, respectively. Inclusion index values ranged from 19% 
among Madhesi Dalits to as high as 94% among the Newars, reflecting high 
discrimination between caste and ethnic groups.
development or capability, as determined by this index, 
hinders their representation and participation in state and 
society– which, in turn, perpetuates their low level of human 
development. Unless broken by the state, this cycle can only 
continue.  
Unequal participation in State organs 
There is an unequal representation of different caste and 
ethnic groups in state organs and various elements of society 
including the executive, judicial and legislative branches of 
government, constitutional bodies, public service, political 
party leadership, local government heads and the heads of 
industrial, commercial, academic, professional, cultural, 
science and technology, and civil society associations. 
The situation in Nepal regarding participation 
in the Supreme Court and cabinet by different caste 
and ethnic groups is also unequal. The Brahman and 
Chhetri, comprising one-third of the population, occupy 
about three quarters of the positions on the Supreme 
Court and council of ministers. Somewhat similar is 
the situation for the Newar. On the other hand, Dalits 
and Janajatis have been further marginalized and their 
situation has not improved over time (Table 5). Thus, men 
in the hill Brahman/Chhetri group and Newars dominate all 
three state organs: legislature, executive and judiciary. 
It is important to note that in the history of Nepal after 
Table 2: Literacy Rate of Individuals 6 Years and 
above by Caste and Ethnic Groups, 1991 and 2001
Caste and Ethnic 
Groups
Literacy Rate Increase  
(%)1991 2001
All Hill/Tarai 
Brahman/Chhetri 
(B/C)
53.1 67.5 14.4
 Hill B/C 52.6 67.1 14.5
Tarai B/C 59.4 73.9 14.5
Tarai Middle Castes 29.6 41.7 12.1
Dalit 22.6 33.8 11.2
Hill Dalit 26.8 41.9 15.1
Tarai Dalit 11 21.1 10.1
  Janajatis 40 53.6 13.6
Hill Janajati 43.1 56.2 13.1
Newar/Thakali 61 72.2 11.2
Other Hill Janajati 38.2 52.1 13.8
Tarai Janajati 28.7 44.8 16.1
Religious
Minorities/Muslims
23.1 34.5 11.3
Others 25.6 50.1 24.5
Total 40.1 53.7 13.7
Source: TPAMF 2005.
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percentage of the parliament (23%), their representation was 
considerably smaller than their proportion in the population 
(38%); however, their representation in the Constituent 
Assembly (CA) election improved substantially.13 
Unequal participation in bureaucracy
The participation of different caste and ethnic groups in 
the government bureaucracy is far from equal. In fact, the 
recruitment of gazetted officers (professionals) from Dalits, 
Janajatis, Tarai castes, and Muslims did not improve during 
the decade post-1990, while that of the Brahman/Chhetri 
group increased from 67 to 87 percent for the same period. 
The predominance of gazetted officers from the Brahman/
Chhetri group actually increased from 70 to nearly 90 percent 
between 1985 and 2002––and both Muslims and Dalits were 
almost invisible in government posts (Annex 6).
A similar situation exists in other branches of government. 
Among higher level police officers, 79 percent come from 
Brahman/Chhetri group, 13 percent from Janajati (only 1% 
from the Tarai Janajati), 11 percent from Newar and 0.5 
percent from Dalit (Deva 2002). One of the reasons why 
Dalit, Janajatis and women are under-represented in these 
institutions is that their representation in political parties 
was nominal. Thus, the outcomes of political exclusion are 
manifested in other dimensions as well.
SUmmAry And conclUSion
Based on the analysis of horizontal inequalities in the 
preceding section, the key findings are as follows:
i. poverty rates are higher among Dalits, Muslims and 
Janajatis in comparison to other castes; and the rate 
of poverty reduction is less among these caste and 
ethnic groups compared to others, implying growing 
economic inequality.
ii. The higher inequality is a result of the low income earned 
by Dalits, Janajatis and Muslims because they have 
fewer options and only a small number of them work 
in administrative and technical positions which have 
much better pay than the alternatives available.
iii. The literacy rate among Dalits and Muslims is far less 
than that of other caste and ethnic groups; and the 
increase in the literacy rate among Dalits and Muslims 
is not higher than that of other groups, even as late as 
in 2001.
iv. Like literacy rate the proportion of people with SLC 
(grade 10) or higher level of education among Dalits, 
Muslims and Janajatis was significantly less than their 
share in total population. In fact, the proportion of 
13. Women have always had a very small political voice and 
representation (DFID and World Bank 2005). Their representation in 
Parliament has remained at an average of six percent over two decades. In 
the recent CA election, women gained 197 of the 601 seats. This represents a 
dramatic improvement in the situation of women. 
1951, all but one of the prime ministers (a Newar) came from 
the Brahman and Chhetri group (Lawoti 2007). Most of the 
opposition party leaders in parliament have also happened to 
be Brahman, Chhetri and Newar. 
Moreover, the private sector is dominated first by Newars 
followed by Brahman and Chhetri. These two groups held 
about 90 percent of the top positions in prominent Nepali 
NGOs and human rights groups in 1999. They have an 80 
percent hold in the media industry as editors, publishers and 
columnists. These data show that BCN males have enjoyed 
most of the power in both state and civil society (Lawoti 
2007).
The composition of the parliaments highlights the 
exclusion of certain groups. The Brahmans and Chhetris 
have held around 60 percent of the parliamentary positions 
since 1959. The Newars have hovered just below 10 percent 
(Annex 5). In the 14 years since the advent of multi-party 
democracy in 1990, only one Dalit was elected to the House of 
Representatives. While the Janajatis do make up a substantial 
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Population and Their 
Educational Attainment by Caste and Ethnic Groups, 1991 
and 2001
Caste and 
Ethnic Groups 
Percent of 
population 6 
years+
Of  which, percent  literate
Total  
SLC and  
above
Graduate 
and above
1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
All Hill/Tarai 
Brahman/
Chhetri (B/C)
33.8 32.8 57.2 59.4 59.2 66.7
Hill B/C 31.6 30.9 49.2 54.3 48.9 59.7
Tarai B/C 2.2 1.9 8 5.1 10.3 7
Tarai Middle 
Castes
10.7 12.9 8.8 9.2 6 7.7
Dalit 11.9 11.8 1.3 1.6 0.7 0.8
Hill Dalit 8.8 7.1 0.9 1 0.4 0.5
Tarai Dalit 3.1 4.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3
Janajati 35.5 37.2 29.1 27.4 30.1 22.3
Hill Janajati 27.7 28.5 26.3 23.8 28.9 20.1
 Newar/
Thakali 
5.7 5.5 18.5 12.7 23.9 13.6
 Other hill 
Janajati
22 23 7.8 11.1 5 6.5
Tarai Janajati 7.9 8.7 2.9 3.7 1.2 2.2
Religious 
Minorities/
Muslims
3.6 4.3 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.2
Others 4.4 1 2.1 1 2.4 1.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: TPAMF 2005.
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Table 4: Human Development Index by Caste and Ethnic Groups, Nepal, 2006
Caste and Ethnic Groups 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth
Adult 
literacy
Mean 
year of 
schooling
Per capita 
income (in 
PPP US$)
Human 
Devt Index
All Brahman/Chhetri 62.9 63.6 4.4 2,027 0.552
Hill Brahman(B) 68.1 69.9 5.4 2,395 0.612
Hill Chhetri (C ) 60.6 58.4 3.7 1,736 0.514
Madhesi B/C 63.9 83.8 6.4 2,333 0.625
Tarai/Madhesi Other Caste 61.9 41.8 2.3 1,119 0.450
All Dalit 61.0 38.0 1.7 977 0.424
Hill Dalit 60.9 45.5 2.1 1,099 0.449
Tarai Dalit 61.3 27.3 1.2 743 0.383
Newar 68.0 68.2 4.7 3,097 0.616
All Janajati excluding Newar 62.9 51.7 3.0 1,405 0.494
Hill/Mountain Janajati 63.6 53.8 3.0 1,490 0.507
Tarai Janajati 61.5 48.1 2.8 1,224 0.470
Muslim 61.0 30.3 1.6 890 0.401
All Caste and Ethnic Groups 63.7 52.4 3.2 1,597 0.509
Source: UNDP/Nepal 2009.
Table 5: Representation of Caste and Ethnic Groups in Different Sectors of Society, Nepal, 1999 and 2005
Sector 
 B/C/T/S Nationalities  Madhesi  Dalit   Newar   Others   Total  
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005
Public Sector 235 82 42 7 56 9 4 2 36 14         -        -    373 114
Political Sector 97 93 25 20 26 11        - 1 18 14         -        -    166 139
Private Sector 7 21  3 15 30        -  20 42         -        -      42 96
Civil Society 69 94 3 9 8 18        - 1 16 19         -        -      96 141
Total 408    290 70      39 105 68 4        4 90     89         -        -    677     490 
Percentage (a) 60.3 59.2 10.3 7.9 15.5 13.9 0.6 0.8 13.3 18.2   100.0 100.0
Caste in Total 
Population - %(b)
31.6 30.9 22.1 23.1 30.9 31.5 8.8 7.9 5.6 5.5 1.1 1.2 100.0 100.0
Ratio (a/b) 1.9 1.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 2.4 3.3     
Note:  The public sector includes supreme court, constitutional bodies, cabinet, Secretaries, lower and upper houses, whereas political sector includes 
leaders of political parties. Similarly, private sector refers to leadership of FNCCI (Federation of Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industries) and 
Chamber of Commerce. Civil society includes the chiefs of different professional groups and media house. 
Source: Neupane, 2005; Lawoti 2002 and 2007.
44 HIMALAYA  XXVIII (1-2) 2008
comparison of past and present values of wellbeing indicators 
hints that many of these inequalities have worsened in recent 
years, resulting in the prolonged continuation of civil war. 
Therefore, Nepal might return to conflict if the government 
does not address these issues. This requires a transformation 
of state and society as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace 
Accord, Interim Constitution and other peace agreements and 
understandings. It is expected that the upcoming constitution 
will take these into account and provide a solid base for 
transforming and creating a peaceful, just and prosperous 
new Nepal.
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people with higher  level of education among Janajatis 
decreased during the period 1991-2001, implying 
further increase in the social dimension of the 
horizontal inequality.
v. The level of human development of excluded groups 
such as the Dalits and Muslims is significantly below 
that of Brahman/Chhetri and Newar. There has not 
been a significant change in the trend of human 
development.
vi. The participation of Dalits and Janajati in the three state 
organs was much less than that of the Brahman, Chhetri 
and Newar. In fact, such an unequal representation has 
continued for a long period of time, suggesting that 
there are established political inequalities in Nepal. 
Thus, the above findings very much support the assertion 
that horizontal inequalities are prevalent and increasing in 
all four dimensions. Although Marxist leadership seems to be 
rarer now in the world, this was the main reason for group 
mobilization in Nepal. Socio-economic inequality formed a 
solid basis for the mobilization of excluded and poor classes 
by Maoist leaders who were unsatisfied with the 1990 
constitution and rejected taking part in the parliamentary 
elections even after the restoration of democracy in 1990. 
While these inequalities are rooted in the long history of 
Nepal, why was it at this particular time that a violent rising of 
Nepali citizens occurred, resulting in the deaths of thousands 
of people and in billions of rupees in property damage? The 
reason was that these groups were mobilized by Maoists with 
a 40-point demand that touched on all the dimensions of 
discrimination and exclusion. 
In fact, the Maoist insurgency appealed to ethnic liberation 
movements and promised to correct widespread injustices 
driven by caste, geography and minority status. The Maoists 
had strong appeal for the common masses because it captured 
their sentiments. Many Nepalis felt that they had been the 
victims of poor governance, neglect, and systemic inequalities, 
and that with Maoist rule these problems would be corrected. 
The Maoist ideology of the insurgent rebels incorporated the 
politics of class struggle and rejected the elite group domination 
of political and economic processes. The geographic and caste 
support for the rebellion corresponded to the patterns of 
social exclusion, with the greatest support for Maoist fighters 
in the rural areas most affected by exclusionary practices.
That the conflict lasted for more than a decade is due 
mainly to the long and deep-seated horizontal inequalities, 
which is evident from the data presented above. It is very 
unlikely that there would have been such an enduring conflict 
had there not been inequality and exclusion. Therefore, this 
validates the two arguments that were posed in the beginning 
of the paper that (i) conflict is likely when there is inequality 
in social, economic and political dimensions; and (ii) the 
conflict thrives when the inequality is growing. 
In conclusion the horizontal inequalities—or inequality 
between different caste and ethnic groups—provided an 
enabling environment for the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The 
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ANNEX 1: Percentage Distribution of Population by Some Social 
Characteristics, Nepal, 2001 
Population groups Number %
Religion 22,736,934 100.0
Hindu 18,330,121 80.6
Buddhists 2,442,520 10.7
Islam 954,023 4.2
Kirant 818,106 3.6
Other 192,164 0.8
Languages 22,736,934 100.0
Nepali 11,053,255 48.6
Maithili 2,797,582 12.3
Bhojpuri 1,712,536 7.5
Tharu 1,331,546 5.9
Tamang 1,179,145 5.2
Newar 825,458 3.6
Magar 770,116 3.4
Others 3,067,296 13.5
Caste and Ethnic Groups 22,736,934 100.0
Hill/Tarai Brahman/Chhetri (B/C) 7,450,564 32.8
Hill 7,023,219 30.9
Tarai 427,345 1.9
Tarai Middle Castes 2,938,827 12.9
Dalit 2,675,182 11.8
Hill 1,615,577 7.1
Tarai 1,059,605 4.7
Janajati 8,460,702 37.2
Mountain 177,713 0.8
Hill 6,056,841 26.6
Inner Tarai 250,460 1.1
Tarai 1,975,688 8.7
Religious Minorities (Muslim) 980,018 4.3
Others 231,641 1.0
Note: Because of the higher status of the Newar, at times they are not included in the Janajati. The Newar population 
consists of 5.5% of the total population. Therefore, if Newar is excluded, the proportion of Janajati is less than 32 
percent of the total population.
Source: CBS 2003, Vol I; and UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006.
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 Caste and Ethnic Groups Avg. per capita income (NRs.)
Avg. 
household size
Avg. per capita 
urban (NRs.)
Avg. per capita 
rural (NRs.)
All Brahman/Chhetri (B/C) 18,400 33,731 15,674
Hill 16,200 5.78 34,678 13,628
Tarai 23,900 5.54 32,408 21,465
 
Tarai Middle Caste 11,300 7.22 12,736 11,212
  
All Dalit 10,000 19,381 9,026
Hill 8,830 5.64 18,602 8,018
Tarai 13,200 5.98 20,460 11,927
  
Newar 26,100 6.43 36,600 14,660
  
All Janajati 13,300 25,750 12,216
Hill 13,500 5.97 26,448 11,987
Tarai 12,700 9.68 14,106 12,719
  
Muslim 10,200 8.29 11,563 10,126
 
Nepal 15,000 28,957 12,534
 Note: NRs. refers to Nepali Rupees. 
Source: CBS 2005.
ANNEX 3: Average per capita (urban/rural) income (NRs.) by caste and ethnic groups
Geographic Region Poverty Head Count Rate (%)
Sector 1995/96 2003/04 % Change
Urban 21.6 9.6 -56
Rural 43.3 34.6 -20
NLSS Regions
Kathmandu 4.3 3.3 -23
Other Urban 31.6 13.0 -59
Rural Western Hill 55.0 37.4 -32
Rural Eastern Hill 36.1 42.9 19
Rural Western Tarai 46.1 38.1 -17
Rural Eastern Tarai 37.2 24.9 -33
Development Region
Eastern 38.9 29.3 -25
Central 32.5 27.1 -17
Western 38.6 27.1 -30
Mid-Western 59.9 44.8 -25
Far-Western 63.9 41.0 -36
Ecological Belt
Mountain 57.0 32.6 -43
Hill 40.7 34.5 -15
Tarai 40.3 27.6 -32
Nepal 41.8 30.8 -26
ANNEX 2:   Nepal: Poverty Incidence by Geographical Region
1995/96 and 2003/04
Note: NLSS refers to Nepal Living Standards Survey. This survey has 
been designed in such a way that it can provide estimates of poverty 
rate at the following level of dis-aggregations: rural and urban, three 
ecological regions; five development regions; and six NLSS regions. 
Source: CBS 2005.
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Caste and Ethnic Groups 
Percentage of the Economically Active Population aged 10-year and 
above by Caste and Ethnic Groups  
Prof/Tech. Workers Administrative Workers
Proportion of 
Population 
1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001
Hill/Tarai Brahman/Chhetri (B/C) 3.2 8.1 0.5 1 33.8 32.8
Hill B/C 3 7.8 0.5 1 31.6 30.9
Tarai B/C 7.1 12.2 1 1.7 2.2 1.9
Tarai Middle Caste 1.8 3 0.1 0.3 10.7 12.9
Dalits 0.2 0.6 0 0.1 11.9 11.8
Hill Dalits 0.2 0.7 0 0.1 8.8 7.1
Tarai Dalits 0.3 0.5 0 0 3.1 4.7
Janajatis 1.2 3.3 0.3 0.5 35.5 37.2
Hill Janajatis 1.2 3.6 0.3 0.6 27.7 28.5
 Newar/Thakali 3.4 8.4 1.4 1.7 5.7 5.5
Other Hill Janajatis 0.8 2.1 0.1 0.3 22 23
Tarai Janajatis 1 1.9 0.1 0.2 7.9 8.7
Religious Minorities/Muslims 1.1 1.7 0.2 0.2 3.6 4.3
Others 0.9 4.3 0.1 0.8 4.4 1
Total 1.8 4.6 0.3 0.6 100 100
Source: TPAMF 2005.
ANNEX 4: Occupational Distribution of Labour Force by Caste and Ethnic Groups, 1991 and 2001
ANNEX 5: Representation of Different Caste and Ethnic Groups in Parliament, Nepal, 1959-1999
UNDP/RIPP and NTG 2006; and Neupane 2005.
Caste and  
Ethnic Groups 1959 1967* 1978* 1981* 1986* 1991 1994 1999
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Brahman 30 28 30 24 27 21 14 13 23 21 77 38 86 42 77 38
Chhetri 34 31 47 38 46 36 41 37 43 38 39 19 40 20 44 22
Newar 4 3.7 15 12 10 7.9 9 8 7 6.3 14 6.8 13 6.3 14 6.8
Janajati except 
Newar 21 19 21 17 28 22 36 32 29 26 48 23 38 19 35 17
Tarai High & 
Middle Caste 18 17 11 8.8 11 11 10 8.9 10 8.9 21 10 24 12 27 13
Muslim 2 1.8 0 0 1 0.8 2 1.8 0 0 5 2.8 4 1.9 2 0.9
Dalit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 109 100 125 100 127 100 112 100 112 100 205 100 205 100 205 100
Source: Civil Service Documentation Centre 2006.
Caste and 
Ethnic 
Groups
Special 
Class
Gazetted Level Total Positions
First Class Second Class Third Class No %
Brahman 63.2 57.9 54.4 59.8 4,721 58.3
Chhetri 15.8 15.9 13.2 13.2 1,080 13.3
Newar 18.4 17.1 17.5 12.7 1,152 14.2
Janajati 2.6 0.8 3.3 3.4 264 3.3
Dalit 0.0 0.8 0.5 1.1 74 0.9
Madhesi 0.0 7.6 11.1 9.7 805 9.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 8,096 100.0
ANNEX 6: Composition in Gazetted Level Employees by Caste and Ethnic Groups  (by percent)
